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Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Don’t Win
Richard Moberly
University of Nebraska College of Law

Whistleblowers played a significant role in revealing and disrupting corporate malfeasance at the
beginning of the 21st century, as scandals at corporations such as Enron and WorldCom came to public
light through the efforts of whistleblowing employees. Subsequently, Congress recognized the importance of whistleblowing and included strong and
unprecedented anti-retaliation protection for corporate employees as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (the Act), the mammoth congressional reaction
to these corporate scandals.

including back-pay, non-economic damages and
reinstatement. Moreover, the congressionally mandated burden of proof for causation favors employees
more than many retaliation protections. Indeed, a few
early victories for employees sparked outrage from
management attorneys, who argued that SarbanesOxley’s protections were too broad and overly burdensome for employers—a sign that perhaps the Act
provided real protections for whistleblowers.

The Initial Reaction

Despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s pro-whistleblower provisions and a few early employee victories, however,
administrative decisions over the first three years of
the Act’s life failed to fulfill these expectations that a
strong anti-retaliation provision would protect whistleblowers. During this time, 491 employees filed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints with OSHA. OSHA resolved
361 of these cases and found for employees only 13
times, a win rate of 3.6 percent. On appeal from 93
OSHA decisions, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in
the Department of Labor found in favor of six employees, a win rate of 6.5 percent.
The win rate is surprisingly low compared to other
employment-related statutes. For example, even
though Congress based Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections
upon the provisions of a whistleblower statute that
protects airline industry whistleblowers, these airline whistleblowers succeeded at more than twice the
rate of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers (9.8 percent)
in OSHA investigations. The EEOC finds for employees 14.1 percent of the time in sexual harassment cases,
and 13.0 percent of employees win employmentrelated cases in federal court.

The Reality: Low “Win” Rate So Far

After the Act was passed, scholars and whistleblower advocates believed that Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections would often result in favorable outcomes for whistleblowers. For example, soon
after the Act’s enactment, Professor Robert Vaughn
asserted that the statute is “the most important whistleblower protection law in the world.” Tom Devine,
legal director for the Government Accountability
Project, a whistleblower advocacy group, described
the Act as “the promised land. … [T]he law represents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech
[that] far surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available
for government workers.” Taxpayers Against Fraud
called the statute “the single most effective measure
possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle
and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.”
The language of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation
protections justified this initial reaction. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, millions of workers were protected from
retaliation for revealing corporate wrongdoing only
sporadically, if at all. The Act now purports to protect these workers by permitting them to file claims
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency that will initially
investigate such complaints. If OSHA finds that an
employer retaliated against a whistleblower, the
Act provides significant remedies for the employee,

Analyzing the Low Win Rate
While the low win rate is surprising and important, we should also be concerned with the way in
which OSHA and the ALJs decided Sarbanes-Oxley
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whistleblower cases. After examining over three
years worth of cases, I found that there are two explanations for Sarbanes-Oxley’s low employee win rate.
First, employees frequently lost because OSHA and
the ALJs determined that a large number of employees either violated a procedural rule or did not meet
Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory requirements as a matter of law (i.e., the employees did not demonstrate
that their claim fit within the Act’s legal “boundaries”). Thus, OSHA and the ALJs rejected a large percentage of cases (66.7 percent for OSHA, 95.2 percent
for ALJs) for failing to fit within the legal parameters of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim, thereby avoiding any
determination of the factual merits of an employee’s
allegations.
In so doing, these administrative decision makers often strictly interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal
requirements. For example, whistleblowers rarely
were equitably excused for missing a procedural
deadline, such as the statute of limitations. Moreover, although Sarbanes-Oxley applies to a “contractor, subcontractor, or agent” of any publicly-traded
company, ALJs consistently determined that the Act
did not protect employees of privately-held subsidiaries and contractors of publicly-traded companies.
Furthermore, ALJs and the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) (the last level of administrative review)
required extraordinary specificity from whistleblowers regarding their disclosure of illegal activity and
refused to protect whistleblowers who disclosed general fraud as opposed to fraud related specifically to
securities.
This strict legal scrutiny might have many causes; I
posit that it likely resulted from the push and pull of
defining a new statute’s legal boundaries. Employees,
perhaps relying on expectations generated by scholars and whistleblower advocates, brought claims that
tested the boundaries of this new statute. Administrative decision makers responded by interpreting potentially ambiguous provisions of the statute
narrowly.
A second reason for the low employee win rate is
that OSHA tended to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof for the few cases that survived the agency’s strict legal scrutiny. Despite a burden of proof
for causation that clearly favors employees, OSHA
decided in favor of the employee in only 10.7 percent
of the cases in which it evaluated the causation element of an employee’s allegations (meaning cases in
which a decision maker determined that the case fell
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within the legal “boundaries” of a Sarbanes-Oxley
claim). By contrast, when ALJs adjudicated causation,
employees won 55.6 percent of the time. I suggest that
OSHA’s regulations and budgetary restraints contributed to its failure to apply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden
of proof appropriately.
Amending the statute could address the interpretative and investigative problems I identified,
which would better reflect Congress’ goals of protecting whistleblowers and remedying retaliation. First,
fully one-third of all employees who lost at the ALJ
Level and 18 percent who lost at the OSHA Level
lost because the employee failed to satisfy SarbanesOxley’s short 90-day statute of limitations. Because
this procedural issue has little to do with the substantive merits of the whistleblower’s claim, I suggest
extending this statute of limitations to a minimum
of 180 days. This extension will make the Act’s limitations period similar to those found in equivalent
whistleblower protection statutes and also should
provide a more reasonable period of time for whistleblowers to file complaints.
Second, the Act’s legal “boundaries” should be
clarified. When OSHA and the ALJs interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory boundaries, these administrative decision makers strictly examined two areas
in particular: whether the respondent was a “covered
employer” and whether the employee engaged in
“protected activity.” For example, Congress should
clarify that the Act protects employees of privatelyheld companies when they report fraud at publiclytraded corporations. Moreover, Congress should
amend the Act to explicitly overrule administrative
decisions that require a whistleblower disclosure to
relate to securities fraud, as opposed to general fraud,
and decisions that fail to protect employees who
refuse to engage in illegal activity. OSHA and the
Office of Administrative Law Judges also should publicize and disseminate certain statistical and substantive information about Sarbanes-Oxley cases in order
to further clarify their interpretations of the Act’s
legal protections and to moderate any bias toward a
particular party.
Third, the Act’s employee-friendly burden of proof
regarding causation needs to be revitalized by altering OSHA’s investigative procedures and providing
OSHA more investigative resources. As an alternative, I suggest removing OSHA from its current investigative role and replacing OSHA’s process with one
of three substitutes: (1) permitting whistleblowers to
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file claims directly in federal court; (2) beginning the
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative process with hearings
before an ALJ rather than with an OSHA investigation; or (3) assigning OSHA’s investigative responsibilities to another agency, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Any of these options
could address OSHA’s current misapplication of the
Act’s burden of proof scheme.
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley’s failures should cause
Congress to consider broader whistleblower protections. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley currently applies
only to employees of publicly-traded corporations.
To avoid the difficult line-drawing issues apparent in
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative decisions, a broader
whistleblower provision could apply to employers
with a specific number of employees, which would
clarify the Act’s applicability by importing a wellknown standard from other employee protection
statutes. Furthermore, the Act currently protects only
employees who disclose illegalities related to six specific areas of federal law. Providing statutory protections for whistleblowers who report any unlawful
activity by their employer would clarify the extent of
protections available to employees.
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Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley failed to fulfill the
great expectations generated by the Act’s purportedly strong anti-retaliation protections. This failure
may be dangerous to efforts for improved corporate
governance, because the recent corporate scandals
powerfully reinforced the notion that employees are
uniquely positioned to identify and to report corporate misconduct. Employees’ internal placement in
the corporate structure often provides them with better information about wrongdoing than external corporate monitors, such as the government or outside
attorneys and accountants.
This monitoring can only be effective, however,
if the law protects whistleblowers from retaliation.
Employees will report wrongdoing less frequently
unless they are given credible assurances that they will
be safe from retaliation. Unfortunately, during the first
years of its existence, Sarbanes-Oxley did not sufficiently protect whistleblowers and thus cannot provide
such assurances. As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley requires
further congressional and administrative scrutiny in
order to fulfill Congress’ and employees’ expectations
that whistleblowers will be protected from retaliation
for blowing the whistle on corporate malfeasance.

